Of promoting networking and protecting privacy: Effects of defaults and regulatory focus on social media users’ preference settings by CHO, Hichang et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
1-2019 
Of promoting networking and protecting privacy: Effects of 
defaults and regulatory focus on social media users’ preference 
settings 
Hichang CHO 
Sungjong ROH 
Singapore Management University, sroh@smu.edu.sg 
Byungho PARK 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the Social Media Commons 
Citation 
CHO, Hichang; ROH, Sungjong; and PARK, Byungho. Of promoting networking and protecting privacy: 
Effects of defaults and regulatory focus on social media users’ preference settings. (2019). Computers in 
Human Behavior. 101, 1-13. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6438 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
  
Of promoting networking and protecting privacy: Effects of defaults and 
regulatory focus on social media users’ preference settings 
Hichang Choa , Sungjong Roh , Byungho Park 
Abstract 
Privacy research has debated whether privacy decision-making is determined by users' stable 
preferences (i.e., individual traits), privacy calculus (i.e., cost-benefit analysis), or “responses on the 
spot” that vary across contexts. This study focuses on two factors—default setting as a contextual 
factor and regulatory focus as an individual difference factor—and examines the degree to which 
these factors affect social media users' decisionmaking when using privacy preference settings in a 
fictitious social networking site. The results, based on two experimental studies (study 1, n = 414; 
study 2, n = 213), show that default settings significantly affect users' privacy preferences, such that 
users choose the defaults or alternatives proximal to them. Study 2 shows that regulatory focus also 
affects privacy decisions, such that users with a strong promotion focus select options favoring a 
higher social networking utility, perceiving lesser cognitive efforts and more confidence in decisions. 
Finally, we find a significant interaction effect between default setting and regulatory focus on 
perceived effort and confidence, suggesting that the default effect is contingent on users’ goal 
orientations (operationalized as regulatory focus). We discuss the implications for research and 
practice 
Keywords: Privacy Default effect Regulatory focus Social media 
1. Introduction 
Though new information and communication technologies (ICTs) enable innovative and effective ways 
of socializing with others, working together, and transacting services and products online, many 
people are concerned about information privacy risks because the personal information they disclose 
online while engaging in these activities can be easily collected, shared, and/or misused by third 
parties, including businesses, governments, and even their own friends. The recent Facebook and 
Cambridge Analytica privacy scandal that resulted in more than 87 million Facebook users' data being 
compromised is one of many examples of privacy risks (BBC News, 2018). More recently, Facebook 
reported that a software bug changed privacy settings of up to 14 million Facebook users, making their 
private posts available to the public (New York Times, 2018a). As privacy risks are increasingly 
prevalent and unpredictable, information privacy is a key factor influencing users’ communication 
behavior (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016), technology acceptance (Shin, 2010a), and their relationship with 
media (Pew Research Center, 2018). 
 
Previous privacy studies have assumed that, to maintain an optimal level of privacy, users engage in 
thoughtful assessments of risks and benefits based on privacy calculus and make rational choices (e.g., 
information disclosure/withholding, network size control) (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Lankton, 
McKnight, & Tripp, 2017). However, research has shown that users are “not always rational but 
paradoxical” (Park, Chung, & Shin, 2018, p. 1323). Further, recent studies have revealed that privacy 
decision-making is also influenced by heuristics and cognitive biases, such as decision frames (Acquisti, 
John, & Loewenstein, 2012) and hyperbolic discounting (Krasnova, Spiekermann, Kololeva, & 
Hildebrand, 2010). For instance, users' privacy preferences can easily be shifted by subtle changes in 
privacy default settings, such as opt-in versus opt-out (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002). Although 
the options that are given to users are logically equivalent, when framed differently in default settings, 
the differences in privacy settings can cause marked reversals in revealed preferences (Baek, Bae, 
Jeong, Kim, & Rhee, 2014; Knijnenburg & Kobsa, 2014). These findings suggest that a user's privacy 
  
decision-making is based on “responses on the spot” rather than on stable privacy preferences or a 
privacy calculus, highlighting the malleability of privacy decision-making and preferences. 
In this study, we examine social media users' privacy decision-making using a novel approach through 
which we investigate the effect of privacy default settings (as a contextual factor) and individuals' goal 
orientations (i.e., regulatory focus as an individual trait) on users' construction of privacy preferences. 
While a significant default effect on users' preferences has been demonstrated elsewhere, previous 
studies also show that its effect may not equally influence all users’ behavior (Knijnenburg & Kobsa, 
2014; Lai & Hui, 2006), suggesting that individual differences or contextual factors should be 
incorporated into a research model to gain a more complete understanding. 
 
Specifically, an important gap in prior privacy studies is that most studies have investigated this topic 
neglecting motivational factors, especially, users' goals. Privacy decision-making inherently involves a 
tradeoff between multiple goals and competing considerations, such as self-promotion, social need 
fulfilment, privacy protection, and security (Vishwanath, Xu, & Ngoh, 2018). It has been suggested that 
goals are a key component of decision-making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Higgins, 
1997, 2011), and that individuals' goal orientations and goal pursuit strategies are determined by a 
distinctive self-regulations system called regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). Therefore, this study 
examines regulatory focus as an important individual trait that can affect users' judgments and 
decisions when individuals construct their preferences using preference settings. For instance, 
individuals’ preference for stability (e.g., maintaining privacy defaults) versus change (e.g., choosing 
alternative, non-default options) can be explained by the distinction between prevention focus and 
promotion focus to the extent that the former is associated with a preference for stability/status quo 
(for prevention/safety), whereas the latter is associated with openness to change (for promotion/gain) 
(Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Whether people with a distinct regulatory focus construe 
privacy as a different goal (privacy as a desirable end-state [i.e., promotion] versus privacy for safety 
and security [i.e., prevention]) and construct their preferences differently is also a theoretical question 
that has yet to be empirically investigated. 
 
In spite of the rational connections between regulatory focus, default effect, and privacy decision-
making, little empirical research has been conducted to investigate the role of regulatory focus in 
relation to privacy (see Craciun, 2018; Lwin, Wirtz, & Stanaland, 2016; Mosteller & Poddar, 2017; for 
exceptions). As such, this study aims to conduct one of the first studies to empirically examine these 
relationships in the social media context. Drawing on previous literature on default effects 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Knijnenburg & Kobsa, 2014) and regulatory focus (e.g., Higgins, 
1997, 2011), we formulated research hypotheses and tested them in two studies in which we (a) 
examine the baseline model focusing on the main effect of default settings on privacy decision-making 
(study 1); (b) test the replicability/robustness of the default effect (study 2); and (c) examine the main 
effect and the moderating effect of regulatory focus in the context of privacy decision-making using 
preference settings (study 2). In doing so, we address the following broad research questions. 
RQ1 
 
To what extent is social media users' privacy decision-making influenced by default settings, regulatory 
focus, and the interaction between them? 
This study aims to contribute to privacy studies by suggesting a theoretical approach to examining the 
effect of a contextual factor (default settings) and an individual factor (regulatory focus) and the 
interplay between them to understand complex mechanisms operating in privacy decision-making. 
The investigation of the potential interaction between default (contextual factor) and regulatory focus 
(individual factor) will enable us to specify boundary conditions under which different default settings 
have differing implications for social media users’ privacy decisions. In addition, its findings would be 
of practical value as they reveal the magnitude of default effects in different conditions and hint at 
optimal default settings for individuals with different traits like regulatory focus. To achieve these 
  
aims, we conducted two empirical studies (Study 1 [n = 414]; Study 2 [n = 213]), and report and discuss 
the findings and their implications. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Privacy decision-making and preference settings 
Privacy decision-making is complex, as it involves not only a high degree of uncertainty but also 
complicated trade-offs between multiple, conflicting goals (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 
2015). According to Altman (1975), privacy management is defined as an interpersonal boundary-
control process that makes us open or close to others. This process is dialectic, dynamic, and 
bidirectional because people encounter with “the competing simultaneous needs to be both social (by 
disclosing information) and private (by withholding information)” (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016, p. 371). 
Therefore, people engage in dynamic and dialectic decision-making processes related to interpersonal 
boundary regulation and privacy management strategies (Petronio, 1991) through which they can 
keep the optimal level of balance between privacy and openness. Likewise, social media users 
negotiate privacy concerns and social capital needs when making privacy-related decisions (Ellison, 
Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; Vishwanath et al., 2018). Because social media users want to 
have strict privacy control through information withholding but at the same time need to share their 
personal data for personalized content and services (Park et al., 2018), trade-off difficulty is inherent 
in privacy decision-making (Vishwanath et al., 2018). The increasing complexity involved in privacy 
management and protection also leads to feelings of resignation and lack of control (Choi, Park, & 
Jung, 2018). 
 
In social media contexts, privacy settings are a primary technological mechanism through which users 
can articulate their desired levels of social connections, information disclosure, and privacy (Ellison et 
al., 2011; Lankton et al., 2017). For instance, with the privacy settings embedded in Facebook, users 
can set their profiles to “Only Me,” “Friends except ___,” “Friends,” and “Public” to control the 
visibility, searchability, and access to their personal information and content. Though seemingly a 
simple choice, this type of decision context involves trade-off difficulty and decisional complexity. 
Because the attainment of one goal (e.g., strict privacy control achieved by limiting access to close 
friends) blocks the attainment of other goals (e.g., high social networking utility with wider audiences), 
an individual must make explicit trade-offs between the conflicting goals. Similarly, use of privacy 
settings involves deciding between stability (i.e., preserving defaults/status quo) and change (choosing 
alternative options). In addition, privacy decision-making involves a high degree of uncertainty 
because the outcome of each choice is not entirely clear to many online users, and neither option 
clearly dominates the other (Acquisti et al., 2015). 
 
Ideally, users can overcome such trade-off difficulties by putting forth extra effort to make the best 
and the most rational decision. However, studies have shown that, when faced with trade-offs and 
uncertainties, people often prefer effort-saving to accuracy (Lee & Benbasat, 2011). A possible reason 
is that the benefit of saving their cognitive load is temporarily near and easily observable than accuracy 
(Lee & Benbasat, 2011). As a result, users are likely to construct their preferences using various 
decisional shortcuts and contextual factors, such as privacy defaults, especially when they have 
unclear preferences or are not motivated to engage in effortful deliberation (Huh, Vosgerau, & 
Morewedge, 2014). In fact, research shows that although users are well aware of the privacy risks in 
social media use, most of them keep the default privacy settings that allow the public to access their 
online profiles and shared content (Gross & Acquisti, 2005), though a recent study showed that about 
40 percent of U.S. Facebook users modified their privacy settings after the Cambridge Analytica 
privacy scandal (Pew Research Center, 2018). 
 
  
2.2. Default effect 
Default is defined as “the choice alternative a consumer receives if he/she does not explicitly specify 
otherwise” (Brown & Krishna, 2004, p. 529). Facebook's privacy settings, for instance, have been set 
to make users' profile information shared-by-default, making it available to the public unless users 
choose otherwise. 
Powerful default effects have been well-demonstrated in various decision-making contexts. Many 
people do not change default settings on software (Mackay, 1991). Similarly, users of smartphone 
apps are more likely to retain more expensive privacy features when the privacy premium features 
are presented as defaults rather than as additional options (Dogruela, Joekelb, & Vitak, 2017). Privacy 
studies also have found that merely framing the question as opt-out instead of opt-in changes users’ 
preferences (Baek et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2002). Similarly, users are more likely to disclose 
personal information in shared-by-default than in privacy-by-default (Knijnenburg & Kobsa, 2014). 
Importantly, a default effect is observed even for a decision requiring a considerable amount of effort 
and accuracy, such as choosing auto insurance options (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 
1993) and participating in organ donations (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The findings suggest that 
default effects cannot occur merely due to individuals’ inattentiveness or laziness, but should operate 
through multiple theoretical mechanisms. 
 
2.2.1. Theoretical mechanisms of default effect 
The default effect can be explained by several theoretical mechanisms. First, due to cognitive and 
physical laziness (i.e., inertia), people are reluctant to make an effort to change to the non-default 
option. However, as noted earlier, studies have shown that effort calculations alone cannot fully 
explain default effects. For instance, when choosing to preserve or abandon the default required the 
same number of mouse clicks, a default effect was still observed (Johnson et al., 2002; Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003). 
 
Second, defaults determine decisions through status-quo bias. People believe that defaults are an 
endowment. Once the defaults are given, they perceive giving it up as loss of a valuable object that 
they possessed. According to the loss aversion and endowment effect (Tversky & Kahneman. 1981), 
the cost of losses looms larger than the pleasure of the equivalent gain. Consequently, people choose 
to keep the endowed option (i.e., defaults) rather than choosing alternative options. The presentation 
of one option as the status quo increases its attractiveness, because it is perceived as a focus of 
evaluation (Dhar & Simonson, 1992), despite the default option was randomly assigned (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). 
 
Third, people are less likely to choose the non-default option to avoid the feeling of regret (Baron & 
Ritov, 1994). According to the omission bias, an act (or its outcomes) is weighted more heavily than 
inaction (or its outcomes) (Baron & Ritov, 1994). People regret more when poor decisions or outcomes 
are due to their own action (i.e., commission) rather than of inaction (i.e., omission) due to perceived 
decision responsibility. This omission bias is distinct from the status-quo bias, as people prefer inaction 
even when keeping the status quo requires actions, and changing the status quo does not require any 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994). 
 
Fourth, individuals also perceive that defaults have been implicitly recommended or endorsed as the 
best option by those who select them (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). In addition, individuals 
perceive the default as an indication of descriptive norms (i.e., many people would choose the same 
thing), and they thus follow a heuristic of imitation (Henrich et al., 2001). 
Taken together, the literature reviewed above suggests that default effects operate through multiple 
theoretical mechanisms that are likely to function simultaneously. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated a default effect on the making of various decisions including privacy preference (Baek 
et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2002; Knijnenburg & Kobsa, 2014), though most studies focused on a 
  
binary choice (default versus nondefault). Studies have shown that when defaults are predefined, 
people evaluate multiple, alternative (non-default) options based on the degree to which they deviate 
from the default or the initial, starting point (Herrmann et al., 2011; Park, Jun, & MacInnis, 2000). The 
literature reviewed above suggest that defaults are perceived as the status quo and serve as a focus 
of evaluation (i.e., the initial value) with which other available options are compared (Dhar & 
Simonson, 1992; Payne et al., 1993). Even when people choose non-default options to make their 
selection in accordance with their own preferences, the default nonetheless influences expressed 
preferences as people direct their decisions toward implicitly or explicitly expressed recommended or 
endowed options (McKenzie et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman. 1981). As such, people are likely to 
preserve defaults or choose options that are proximal to the defaults because they consider them an 
endowment (Johnson et al., 2002) and deviations from them a loss or risky choice (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Hence, we predict that the following baseline hypothesis: 
H1 
Privacy defaults will have an impact on privacy preferences such that people are likely to preserve the 
default or choose alternative options proximal to the defaults. 
2.3. Regulatory focus 
2.3.1. Regulatory focus, privacy preference, and default settings 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 2011) postulates that individuals have two essential, 
distinguishable self-regulatory orientations: promotion focus and prevention focus. A person who has 
a promotion focus is oriented towards maximizing positive outcomes such as goal attainment, 
aspirations, and hope. On the contrary, a prevention-focused individual is oriented towards avoiding 
pain or bad outcomes. Because both types of goal pursuits (nurturance/advancement and protection) 
are essential for survival, it is assumed that all people have both foci to a certain extent. However, 
individuals exhibit stable, and trait-like differences in the predominance of each (Higgins, 1997). A shift 
in regulatory focus can also be momentarily induced by situational features, such as task instructions 
or message frames (Higgins, 1997). 
Little research has examined whether privacy preference is a function of regulatory focus (Craciun, 
2018; Jin, 2012). Promotion focus is associated with a preference for advancement, gain/attainment, 
and preference for eagerness strategies, whereas prevention focus is related to loss prevention and 
vigilance strategies. As such, it can be posited that strong promotion-focused people are likely to 
prefer higher levels of accessibility/permeability to maximize social networking sites' (SNSs) utility, 
whereas strong prevention-focused individuals prefer high levels of privacy protection to avoid 
potential privacy risks/losses. In the context of e-health website use, strong prevention regulatory 
focus corresponds to greater self-concealment tendency, the tendency to conceal personal 
information from others (Jin, 2012). In social media, social networking and self-promotion are related 
to users’ advancement or promotion-oriented goals, whereas privacy is generally associated with 
prevention-oriented or safety-related user goals (Lwin et al., 2016). Hence, we predict that: 
H2 
Regulatory focus will have an impact on users' privacy preferences. Specifically, promotion focus will 
lead to preferences favoring wider audience groups whereas prevention focus will lead to strict 
privacy management. 
The default effect is conceptually related to deciding between stability and change because users need 
to choose between maintaining the status quo (i.e., default) and pursuing non-default, alternatives. 
According to the endowment effect and decision frames (Payne et al., 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), the defaults function as a background or given condition, and alternative options are 
considered a new action or object, which create an opportunity for change. Studies have suggested 
that regulatory focus can explain preferences for stability versus change (Chernev, 2004; Friedman & 
Förster, 2001; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999; Pham & Higgins, 2005). Promotion-focused 
people employ an eagerness or risk-taking strategy because of their strong focus on maximizing 
  
potential gains and opportunities. As such, promotion-focused individuals are willing to pursue 
alternative possibilities by responding rather than nonresponding (Liberman et al., 1999; Liberman, 
Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001). 
 
In contrast, a vigilance strategy is a preferred mode for people with a strong prevention focus. Due to 
their strong focus on risk minimization, prevention-focused people tend to choose safety/stability 
over accomplishment/change. As a result, prevention-focused individuals are inclined to choose the 
status quo to avoid making mistakes or causing potential losses due to their acts (Herzenstein, 
Posavac, & Brakus, 2007; Pham & Higgins, 2005). Further, Friedman and Förster (2001) suggest that a 
strong prevention focus triggers the risk-averse, cautious information processing and search style, 
leading to perseverance on initially assessed materials (e.g., the starting point in defaults). In 
summary, a promotion focus is conceptually linked to commission bias (i.e., tendency to undertake 
actions), and a prevention focus to an omission bias (i.e., tendency not to undertake actions). 
The literature reviewed above indicates that promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals 
should adopt different goal-pursuit strategies when using privacy preference settings. Specifically, 
individuals with a strong prevention focus are likely to focus on loss prevention. As a result, the 
perceived losses due to the departure from the status quo should appear to be larger to prevention-
oriented than to promotion-oriented individuals (Chernev, 2004). On the other hand, people who have 
a strong promotion focus are likely to focus on maximizing gains and are less sensitive to potential 
losses due to their acts. 
 
Taken together, we predict that default effects (as predicted in H1) can be potentially moderated by 
regulatory focus such that default effects will be intensified for those with a strong prevention focus, 
because they are oriented towards stability, and reduced for promotion-focused individuals, who 
favor actions and change (Pham & Higgins, 2005). Hence, we predict that there is an interaction effect 
between default and regulatory focus. To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one study 
(Craciun, 2018) that examined whether regulatory focus moderates the effect of defaults (opt-in 
versus opt-out) on consumers’ information sharing intentions: their willingness to share personal 
information with third party service providers in an e-commerce setting. The study demonstrated that 
the opt-out default (i.e., “do not disclose”) led to a significant decrease in the propensity of 
information sharing for prevention-focused consumers, but not for promotion-focused consumers. 
Though the findings are insightful, it is still unclear whether the same findings can be observed in the 
context of social media in which context (SNSs versus e-commerce), recipients of information (friends 
versus retailers), and choice architecture (multiple options versus dichotomous choices) are different. 
Hence, we test the following hypothesis. 
H3 
The effect of default settings on preferences will be moderated by regulatory focus such that the 
default effect will be stronger for users with a strong prevention focus than for users with a strong 
promotion focus. 
2.3.2. Attitudes, perceived efforts, and confidence 
While H1-H3 focus on the effect of default settings and regulatory focus on behavioral outcomes, we 
also explore their effects on attitudinal and judgmental factors that are central to decision-making: 
attitudes towards the use of privacy settings, perceived effort in decision-making, and confidence. We 
focus on these three outcome factors for the following reasons. First, confidence in choice is defined 
as “beliefs about the goodness of one's judgments or choices” (Sniezek, 1992, p. 124). In a privacy 
decision context, it refers to the degree to which users believe that their privacy choices are in line 
with their desired state of privacy control and information sharing (Church, Anderson, Bonneau, & 
Stajano, 2009). Confidence is central to decision making as it determines if and how those judgments 
or choices are implemented by the decision makers themselves. For instance, overconfidence leads 
to complacency whereas a lack of confidence results in doubt: both inhibiting an individual from taking 
necessary actions. 
  
 
Second, perceived cognitive effort is defined as the perceived amount of effort required to make a 
decision (Lee & Benbasat, 2011). In decision-making contexts, individuals want to achieve two primary 
(often conflicting) goals: increasing the accuracy of the decision and reducing cognitive effort 
(Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). People generally prefer decision-support systems that are perceived 
to provide accurate recommendations and want to be confident in their choices (Lee & Benbasat, 
2011). However, decision means can be valued less when they are perceived to incur high cognitive 
effort (e.g., Payne et al., 1993), particularly when a choice task involves uncertainty and trade-off 
difficulty (as in the case of privacy decision-making). For instance, social media users perceive that 
privacy settings are confusing and time-consuming, resulting in a lack of motivation to put effort to 
manage privacy using preference settings (Lipford, Besmer, & Watson, 2008). Therefore, perceived 
cognitive effort is another key factor determining decision-making processes (e.g., the choice 
heuristics and the effort expenditure) and the quality of decisions about privacy. 
 
Third, because this study tests privacy decision-making using technological mechanisms (i.e., privacy 
preference settings), we examine attitudes towards privacy setting use as another key variable. 
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), people drive value not only from the outcomes 
of the choices they make, “but also from their subjective assessments of the process by which those 
choices are made” (Pham & Higgins, 2005, p. 37). As such, we focus on attitudes towards privacy 
setting use that is defined as individuals' assessment of favorableness of using default settings as a 
means of constructing their privacy preferences. Attitudes towards technology use are a key factor 
influencing technology acceptance as well as continued use (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003), 
including social media (Shin, 2010b) and decision-support systems (Jiang, Muhanna, & Klein, 2000). 
Attitudes towards technology use also affect user experiences, such as users’ overall satisfaction with 
health informatics services (Shin, Lee, & Hwang, 2017). Hence, we examine attitudes as an important 
variable in our study. 
 
In short, previous studies have emphasized that judgmental factors are “just as important to the 
ultimate outcomes of the decision as the quality of decision itself” (Sniezek, 1992, p. 124). Therefore, 
we claim that this study's additional focus on these factors enables a more comprehensive 
understanding of affective (i.e., attitudes), cognitive (i.e., perceived effort and confidence) and 
behavioral (i.e., choice outcomes) aspects of privacy decision-making. 
 
More importantly, the regulatory focus literature suggests that regulatory focus is a key factor 
influencing attitudes and judgments in decision-making (Higgins, 1997). Regulatory focus theory 
proposes that people with different goal orientations have different preferences for goal-pursuit 
strategies (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Cesario & Higgins, 2008). When decision means are 
compatible with their goal orientations (e.g., approach [or avoidance] means for people with a strong 
promotion [or prevention] focus), regulatory fit occurs. With regulatory fit, people find it easy to 
respond to decision task (Cesario et al., 2004), because it is compatible with how they naturally think 
and behave (Higgins, 1997), resulting in feelings of rightness, favorable attitudes, and confidence in 
judgments in decision-making (Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Chernev, 2009). 
 
Likewise, we predict that regulatory focus will have an impact on users’ attitudes and judgments when 
making privacy decisions using preference settings. As privacy preference settings provide users with 
an opportunity to pursue goal attainment (be the goal privacy or social networking), users with a 
strong promotion focus are likely to have a favorable user experience when equipped with a decision 
support system that enables them to construct and specify a desired level of privacy/social 
networking. Specifically, an actor with a strong promotion focus is more likely to use preference 
settings as eager strategic means that enables the achievement of positive outcomes (optimal privacy 
and/or networking levels; ensuring “hits”) and prevent the absence of positive outcomes (commission 
  
bias; the preference not to close off possible advancements). Most privacy preference settings on 
social media (e.g., Facebook) provide users with multiple options (e.g., only me, friends only, public) 
and let them choose their desired option. A strong promotion focus, when matched with appropriate 
goal pursuit means, such as preference settings, leads to a regulatory fit. 
 
As reviewed above, individuals feel right about their decisions when decision frames are compatible 
with their goal orientations. A strong regulatory focus, when matched with appropriate goal pursuit 
means, also leads to high engagement in tasks and an increase in processing fluency (Lee & Aaker, 
2004), decreasing perceived effort and increasing both confidence (Cesario et al., 2004) and feelings 
of rightness or correctness (Cesario & Higgins, 2008). Hence, we predict that: 
H4 
a-c: Promotion focus will have a positive impact on (a) attitudes towards privacy setting use, (b) 
perceived effort, and (c) confidence when using privacy settings. 
On the other hand, a prevention-focused user is likely to use privacy settings as vigilant strategic 
means. Use of privacy settings involves the risks of a “false alarm” or commission error, because users 
need to choose between conflicting goals with uncertain outcomes (Aquisti et al., 2015). People with 
a strong prevention focus prefer fewer alternative choices/hypotheses (Liberman et al., 2001) because 
having fewer choices makes it easier for them to eliminate or avoid mistakes/mismatches (e.g., 
commission error: taking actions when they are not right). Due to a strong focus on safety and loss 
aversion related to their prevention focus, prevention-focused people can also be more concerned 
about the risks of making a wrong choice (Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Pham & Higgins, 
2005). Because privacy decision making involves trade-offs and uncertainties, individuals with a strong 
prevention focus are likely to believe that using privacy preference settings to define their preferences 
takes a relatively higher degree of effort and is less favorable (omission bias: avoid mistakes, do not 
choose wrong ones), and to be less confident about their choices. Taken together, we predict that a 
prevention focus will produce a relatively weaker positive (or negative) impact on user experiences: 
H5 
a-c: A strong prevention focus will have a negative impact on (a) attitudes towards privacy setting use, 
(b) perceived effort, and (c) confidence when using privacy settings. 
3. Study 1 
In Study 1, we examined a baseline hypothesis (H1): the default effect on privacy preferences. 
Specifically, users’ privacy preferences were predicted to be malleable such that users are likely to 
choose strict privacy preserving options when privacy-by-default is used, and promotion-enhancing 
options (e.g., higher levels of access) when the option shared-by-default is provided, although the two 
settings present a logically equivalent set of options to users. Facebook preference settings are 
labelled as “privacy settings and tools.” This labelling itself can be a source of priming or the framing 
effect. As a result, we created two labels for preference settings, “privacy preference settings” and 
“networking preference settings” because users can adjust the levels of privacy and social networking 
simultaneously when using preference settings. Similarly, we also created two different names for a 
fictitious SNS (“SocialNET” and “Square”) (a) to rule out potential confounding effects due to name; 
and (b) to explore whether the predicted default effect can be replicated across different contexts. 
Thus, a 2 (default settings) × 2 (labels) × 2 (names) between-subject design was used, though the focus 
of Study 1 was the main effect of default settings on privacy decision-making. 
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Sample and procedures 
We recruited participants through Amazon's MTurk. A total of 414 individuals (188 women, 45.4%) 
participated in this study for $1.00 each. Eligibility criteria were set to include those who are above 18 
years old and who access their SNS account (e.g., Facebook, Google+, Instagram) at least once every 
  
two weeks. Qualtrics, a research software, was employed for the online experiment. At first, 
participants were told that they had decided to use a new SNS named “SocialNET” (or “Square”) 
because many of their friends had migrated to this fast-growing SNS. The new SNS was described as 
having useful features and personalization services: For instance, they could easily migrate all their 
friends lists, their profile, and their old posts from their existing SNS accounts to “SocialNET” (or 
“Square”). Before using “SocialNET,” they were asked to set their “privacy” (or “networking”) 
preference settings to define their preferences through a series of questions, such as “Who can see 
your future posts on your personal page?”, “Who can post on your personal page?”, and “Who can 
see posts/photos tagged?” The question set was adapted from current Facebook privacy preference 
settings. The three questions are conceptually related to interpersonal privacy boundary regulations 
regarding accessibility control, permeability management, and linkages control, respectively (Jia & Xu, 
2016). 
 
Default settings were manipulated by altering the preference settings in each question (see Appendix 
A). Half the participants were randomly assigned to the privacy-by-default condition in which the 
default and the first option was “Only Me.” If a participant wanted to change her preferences to allow 
access to more people, she could click the pull-down menu, and alternative options appeared in the 
order of “Close Friends,” “Friends,” Friends of Friends,” and “Everyone.” In the shared-by-default 
condition, the default was reversed: The default was “Everyone,” followed by “Friends of Friends,” 
“Friends,” “Close Friends,” and “Only Me.” Note that we wanted to emulate current Facebook privacy 
settings. 
 
Labeling was manipulated by changing the name of preference settings (privacy preference settings 
versus network preference settings) in the instructions and the heading shown in each question. 
Naming was manipulated by changing the name of the SNS (“SocialNET” versus “Square”) in a similar 
way.1 
 
The dependent variable was users’ choices for each question/decision (e.g., “Friends” versus “Only 
Me”). The dependent variable in the shared-by-default condition was recoded so that all levels had 
the same meaning across the board (1 = only me, 2 = close friends, 3 = friends, 4 = friends of friends, 
5 = everyone). The experiment took between five and 7 min. 
3.2. Results 
We tested the default effect on privacy decision-making (H1) using ordinal regression analyses, 
because the dependent variable was an ordinal-level, multi-categorical variable. An assumption check 
using the test of parallel lines showed that the location parameters (slope coefficients) were the same 
across response categories. 
 
The results of ordinal regression analyses confirmed the significant default effects on users’ choices 
(H1). Table 1 summarizes the results. As Table 1 shows, the main effect of default setting was 
significant across the board. However, the main effect of labeling and naming was not significant. 
Hence, H1 was supported. We also observed significant two-way interactions between the default and 
label on two questions. As Table 1 shows, the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients were 
negative across the board (baseline/reference group: shared-by-default), indicating that participants 
in the privacy-by-default condition were less likely to choose higher levels/categories (i.e., options 
favoring wider access) than those in the shared-by-default group. The odds ratio indicates the extent 
to which people chose higher levels when using preference settings. For instance, for the first question 
(“who can see your future posts on your personal page?), the odds of those in the privacy-by-default 
group choosing higher levels of access decreased by about four fifths (.22). In other words, those in 
the shared-by-default group were nearly four times more likely to allow higher levels of 
access/permeability than those in the privacy-by-default group. 
 
  
Note that the pseudo R2 values were relatively low (ranging from 0.04 to 0.08). This is not too 
surprising, because there are other factors that influence users’ preferences, many of which will be 
much more important predictors of user preferences than any subtle default effects. The 
low R2 suggests that a research model with only default-related factors should be a poor model to 
predict the response patterns for any particular individual user. However, the low R2 does not refute 
the finding that there is a statistically significant difference in the average user preference levels 
between different default settings. 
 
We noticed that 87–89 percent of people chose the non-defaults in Study 1. We wanted to further 
examine whether the default effects could be observed from those who actively chose non-default 
options that varied in terms of their proximity to the status quo. To do this, we filtered out those who 
maintained the defaults (either “Only Me” or “Everyone”) and tested the default effect (see Table 
1.1 for the results). The effect size ranged from −1.06 to −1.59, and all of them remained statistically 
significant. Overall, it appears that the defaults also had an effect for those who chose non-defaults, 
by pulling their choices toward the default option. The results suggest that inertia or inattentiveness 
cannot be the sole reason for the default effect observed in this study, because people who chose 
alternatives were also influenced by the default setting (i.e., reference category).2 
Table 1. Results of ordinal regression analyses predicting privacy preference levels (study 
1).Results omitting those who chose default settings. 
 
 
Default 
(D) 
Label 
(L) 
Name 
(N) 
D × L D × N L × N D × L × N Pseudo 
R2∗ 
1. Who can see your future posts? −1.53∗∗∗ -.52 –.65 1.18∗ 1.10 .99 −1.28 .05 
2. Who can see posts & photos 
tagged? 
–.50 -.37 .18 .56 –.70 .49 .08 .04 
3. Who can post on your personal 
page? 
−1.75∗∗∗ -.14 -.08 1.35∗ .74 .09 -.94 .08 
 
Default Pseudo 
R2∗ 
1. Who can see your future post? −1.59∗∗ .06 
2. Who can see posts and photos tagged? −1.06∗ .08 
3. Who can post on your personal page? −1.12∗∗∗ .04 
Notes. 
1. Coefficients in the table are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients. 
2. Pseudo R2 is assessed by Nagelkerke measure. 
3. Baseline (reference) groups are: Default (shared-by-default [1]), Label (privacy preference [1]), 
Name (Square [1]). SPSS chooses the last category as a reference category. 
4. ∗ <0.05, ∗∗ <0.01, ∗∗∗ <0.001. 
  
∗ <0.05, ∗∗ <0.01, ∗∗∗ <0.001. 
Overall, the findings confirm a strong default effect: Users' choices can be easily shifted by subtle 
changes of default settings, even though a logically equivalent set of options are presented to them. 
A limitation of Study 1, however, involves the small effect size observed in this study. What remains 
unclear, therefore, is whether the findings are replicable and robust. Given the recent controversies 
about the reproducibility of psychological findings (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), it is worthwhile 
to retest the robustness of the default effect found in study 1. In addition, study 1 focused on the main 
effect of default settings despite there might be other important individual factors that influence 
users’ choices, and the default effect may be contingent upon them. Finally, Study 1 focused on 
behavioral outcomes, though judgmental factors are also crucial in a decision-making context. Thus, 
we conducted study 2 with three goals in mind: (a) to garner additional support for the default effect 
on privacy decision-making; (b) to further investigate the potential role of regulatory focus as an 
individual trait; and (c) to examine the default effect on additional outcome dimensions such as 
attitudes, perceived effort, and confidence. 
 
4. Study 2 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Sample and procedures 
We conducted Study 2, which is similar to Study 1 but has an additional focus on regulatory focus as 
a measured variable, and attitudes, perceived effort, and confidence as dependent variables. Similar 
to Study 1, default and labeling were included as independent, manipulated variables. Note that we 
used only one name (“SocialNET”) in Study 2, because naming did not have any main or interaction 
effects in Study 1. 
A total of 217 participants were recruited through Amazon's MTurk, at a cost of $.50 each. After 
omitting four unreliable responses using an attention-check question, the final data consist of 213 
participants (90 women, 42.3%). We aimed to recruit at least 200 participants. This N was calculated 
using the “pwr2” package in R (Lu, Liu, & Koestler, 2017). This N is expected to provide 80% power for 
detecting an effect size of 0.20 for the two factors (here, default and label) with two levels in balanced 
design, assuming a type 1 error rate of 0.05. This effect size is based on results provided by Study 1, 
which had a small effect size. By assuming this conservative effect size, the required per-cell n for 80% 
power is 50, with 4 cells, requiring a total N of 200. The procedures were similar to those used in Study 
1. After reading the instructions, participants defined their preferences through a series of questions 
using either privacy-by-default (“Only Me” first) or shared-by-default (“Everyone” first). After this, 
they answered questions assessing attitudes, confidence, perceived effort, and regulatory focus. The 
online experiment took between seven and 10 min. 
 
4.1.2. Measures 
Attitudes toward preference settings were assessed using a 3-item scale 
(M = 3.49; SD = 0.82;.α = 0.90) adapted from Igbaria, Livari, and Maragahh (1995). Perceived 
effort was assessed by a 4-item scale (M = 4.38; SD = 0.55; α = 0.88) and confidence in decision-
making by a single item scale (M = 4.23; SD = 0.66), both adapted from Knijnenburg and Kobsa (2014). 
Scores of perceived effort were reversed to represent lesser cognitive effort so that all outcome 
variables could have positive valence in a decision context. Regulatory focus was measured by RFQ 
(Higgins et al., 2001). Promotion focus was assessed by a 5-item scale (M = 3.45; SD = 0.57; α = 0.69) 
and prevention focus by a 5-item scale (M = 3.44; SD = 0.67; α = 0.83). Privacy concern was measured 
by 8-item scale (M = 3.44; SD = 0.88; α = 0.91) adapted from Stewart and Segars (2002). The multiple-
item scales were combined by using mean scores. 
 
  
5. Results 
5.1. Behavioral impact (H1-H3) 
H1 and H2 predicted the main effects of default setting and regulatory focus on users’ preferences, 
respectively, and H3 predicted an interaction effect between default setting and regulatory focus. To 
test these hypotheses, we conducted ordinal regression analyses. Regulatory focus theory assumes 
that promotion focus and prevention focus are not bipolar constructs because people can have high 
levels of both foci simultaneously (Higgins, 2011). However, using two regulatory foci simultaneously 
and testing interaction effects between multiple independent factors created many empty cells when 
conducting ordinal regression analyses. Hence, following Higgins et al. (2001), we created a dummy 
variable assessing relative regulatory focus by computing the difference in scores between promotion 
focus and prevention focus and using the median split for this variable (0 = relatively more prevention 
focused, 1 = relatively more promotion focused). 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of ordinal regression analyses. We observed a significant main effect 
of default settings on three choice questions. Similar to the results of Study 1, the baseline group was 
“shared-by-default” and the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients were all negative, 
indicating that participants were significantly less likely to choose higher levels of access/permeability 
when using privacy-by-default. Hence, H1 was supported. The findings from Study 1 were replicated 
in Study 2. 
Table 2. Results of ordinal regression analyses predicting privacy preference levels (study 2). 
 
Default (D) Label (L) Regulatory 
Focus (RF) 
D × L D × RF L × RF Pseudo 
R2∗ 
Who can see your future posts? −1.33∗∗ –.44 −1.07∗ .46 .46 1.13∗ .09 
Who can see posts & photos tagged? −1.40∗∗ –.04 .08 .35 .51 –.10 .08 
Who can post on your personal page? −1.31∗∗∗ –.87 –.60 .42 .34 .41 .07 
Notes. 
1. Coefficients in the table are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients. 
2. Pseudo R2 is assessed by Nagelkerke measure. 
3. Baseline (reference) groups: Default (shared-by-default), Label (privacy preference), Regulatory 
focus (Promotion focus). 
4. ∗ <0.05, ∗∗ <0.01, ∗∗∗ <0.001. 
The main effect of regulatory focus on one choice item (“Who can see your future posts?”) was 
significant. The baseline group was promotion focus and the coefficient was negative (−1.33, p < .01), 
indicating that individuals with a relatively higher prevention focus were less likely to choose higher 
levels of access/permeability. However, the effect of regulatory focus on the other two outcome 
variables was not significant. Hence, the results partially supported H2. Finally, the interaction effect 
between default and regulatory focus was not significant across the board. Therefore, H3 was not 
supported. 
 
5.1.1. Impacts on attitudes and judgments (H4-H5) 
We ran ordinary least square (OLS) regression analyses predicting the effect of promotion focus (H4) 
and prevention focus (H5) on three attitudinal or judgmental outcomes: (a) attitudes; (b) perceived 
effort; and (c) confidence. We included both foci—promotion focus and prevention focus—as 
  
separate variables in our OLS regression models because we no longer must deal with empty cell 
problems observed in ordinal regression analyses. The results of preliminary analyses also showed 
that prevention focus had significant two-way interaction effects (prevention × default and 
prevention × label). As a result, in our final regression model, we report interaction effects involving 
prevention focus, though they were not predicted in our original hypotheses. On the other hand, 
promotion focus did not have any interaction effects. Because interaction terms involving promotion 
focus were neither hypothesized nor statistically significant, they were not added to the final model 
to avoid overfitting in regression analyses with an overly-complicated model. To examine interaction 
effects, we used the Process Macro in which interaction terms were created using a product indicator 
approach (Hayes, 2013). 
 
The results (see Table 3 for details) showed that a promotion focus had a significant and positive effect 
on attitudes (b = 0.36, t = −3.72, p < .001), perceived (lesser) effort (b = 0.22, t = 3.55, p < .001), and 
confidence (b = 0.29, t = 3.74, p < .001). Hence, H4a, H4b, and H4c were all fully supported. The effect 
of a prevention focus on attitudes (b = −0.16, t = −1.98, p = .049), perceived (lesser) effort 
(b = 0.18, t = 3.38, p < .001), and confidence (b = 0.07, t = 1.03, p = .30) was less pronounced. In 
addition, the effect of prevention focus on attitudes, perceived effort, and confidence was also 
contingent on label and default. Hence, H5 was partially supported. 
 
Table 3. Results of moderated regression analyses. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Attitude Lesser Effort Confidence 
 
b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Default (D) –.15 (.11) –.13 (.07) –.10 (.09) 
Label (L) –.09 (.11) –.03 (.07) .03 (.09) 
Promotion focus (Pr) .36 (.10)∗∗∗ .22 (.06)∗∗∗ .29 (.08)∗∗∗ 
Prevention focus (Pv) –.16 (.08)∗ .18 (.05)∗∗∗ .07 (.07) 
D × L .04 (.22) –.10 (.14) –.19 (.18) 
D × Pv –.05 (.16) .27 (.11)∗ .29 (.13)∗ 
L × Pv .38 (.16)∗ –.09 (.10) –.06 (.13) 
D × L × Pv .29 (.33) .33 (.21) .12 (.26) 
% explained (R2) R2 = .12 R2 = .18 R2 = .11 
Notes. 
1. Base group (Default = Privacy-by-default [0]; Label = networking preference [0]): The Process 
Macro, by default, chooses the smallest number as a reference category. 
  
2. Variables for product terms were mean centered. 
3. ∗ <0.05, ∗∗ <0.01, ∗∗∗ <0.001. 
We further probed the patterns of significant two-way interaction effects observed in Study 2 using 
techniques described by Aiken and West (1991) (see Appendix B for interaction plots). Note that the 
results are post-hoc findings. Fig. 1a describes the patterns of a two-way interaction between 
prevention focus and label. The analysis revealed that participants low in prevention focus 
(operationalized as M – 1SD) reported significantly greater positive attitudes when preference 
settings were labelled as “networking” relative to “privacy” (b = −0.34, t = −2.21, p = .03). In contrast, 
this effect was not observed among participants high in prevention focus 
(M + 1SD), b = 0.17, t = 1.08, p = .28. We also applied the Johnson–Neyman procedure (Bauer & 
Curran, 2005; Johnson & Fay, 1950; Johnson & Neyman, 1936) to identify the transition pointer 
between significance and non-significance of the conditional effect, which is denoted in Fig. 1 with a 
vertical line. The Johnson–Neyman point was −0.69 SD. Complementing this spotlight analysis, a 
simple-slopes analysis suggested that this interaction was mainly driven by judgments about 
“network” preference settings. While the prevention focus significantly predicted attitudes for the 
“networking” setting (b = −0.36, t = −3.19, p < .001), this relationship was not observed for the 
“privacy” setting (t < 1, p = .86). It appears that the potential match between reduced concern for 
prevention focus and a label (emphasizing promotion of a gain: social networking) led to a positive 
effect on attitudes. 
 
The interaction between prevention focus and default setting on perceived effort and on confidence 
are shown in Fig. 1b and c, respectively. As Fig. 1b shows, participants low in prevention (M – 1SD) 
focus reported significantly less perceived effort when privacy-by-default (“Only Me” first) was 
employed, compared to shared-by-default (“Everyone” first), b = −0.31, t = −3.04, p < .001. Yet, such 
effect was not found among participants high in prevention focus (M + 1SD), t < 1, p = .67. The 
Johnson–Neyman point that differentiates between significance and non-significance of the 
conditional effect was −0.19 SD. A simple-slopes analysis further revealed that the interaction effect 
is driven by participants using shared-by-default settings. The prevention focus significantly predicted 
the perceived effort among participants who viewed the shared-by-default settings 
(b = 0.30, t = 4.28, p < .001), but not those who viewed the privacy-by-default settings (t < 1, p = .73). 
We observed a similar pattern for confidence (Fig. 1c). Participants low in prevention focus (M – 1SD) 
reported significantly greater confidence when privacy-by-default settings were employed, compared 
with when shared-by-default settings were given, b = −0.30, t = −2.36, p = .02. Again, this effect was 
not found among participants high in prevention focus (M + 1SD), t < 1, p = .44. The Johnson–Neyman 
point was −1.01 SD. A simple-slopes analysis showed that the interaction effect is primarily driven by 
participants using shared-by-default settings. The prevention focus predicted the confidence among 
participants who saw shared-by-default settings (b = 0.20, t = 2.27, p = .02), but not those who saw 
privacy-by-default settings (b = −0.10, t = −0.95, p = .34). We elaborate on the results in the following 
section. 
 
In summary, in study 2, the default effect on users' preferences was replicated (H1). Regulatory focus 
also has a significant impact on a behavioral choice item (H2), and both a significant main effect and 
significant interaction effects on attitudes and judgmental outcomes (H3 & H4). The findings suggest 
that default effects are robust. In addition, users' goal/motivational orientations (i.e., regulatory 
focus) play an important role in shaping users’ choice as well as their judgments. 
 
6. Discussion 
The aim of this study is to examine the ways in which social media users construct their privacy 
(networking) preferences, focusing on the effect of a contextual factor (default settings) and an 
individual difference factor (regulatory focus) and the interplay between them. 
  
In both studies (study 1 and study 2), we found that default settings have a significant effect on users' 
preferences across different conditions. Specifically, in study 1, the results support H1, which predicts 
a significant default effect on users' privacy decision-making. When privacy-by-default was given 
(“Only Me” first), users’ choices were more privacy-oriented (i.e., restricted access). Conversely, users 
were more likely to allow higher levels of access/permeability (i.e., wider audience group) when the 
default frame was reversed to shared-by-default (“Everyone” first). It is important to note that a 
majority of participants did not select the defaults, but their choices were still close to the defaults. In 
other words, the default effect was observed even for those who chose non-defaults. The findings can 
be explained by the endowment effect (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), or by a 
focus-of-comparison effect (Dhar & Simonson, 1992) that suggests that outcomes are not only 
evaluated on their absolute value but also on their deviation from a reference (an initial, starting) 
point (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). Because people have loss aversion, and because the default is 
perceived to be endowed or implicated recommended, options far from the default would be less 
preferred. Hence, people preferred options close to the default even when they opted for non-default 
options. 
 
In study 2, the baseline, main effect of default is replicated, demonstrating the robustness of default 
effect on privacy decision-making. In addition to the main effect of default settings, study 2 examined 
regulatory focus. The results indicate that regulatory focus is an important motivational factor that 
researchers need to consider when examining users’ privacy-related decision-making. Consistent with 
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 2011) promotion focus and prevention focus have distinct 
relationships with decisional outcomes. Promotion focus has a significant impact on a single choice 
(behavioral) item. It also has a positive impact on attitudinal and judgmental outcomes, regardless of 
default settings. A possible reason for this is that promotion-focused individuals are likely to perceive 
preference settings use as an eager strategic means allowing them to define their desired states, be 
they social networking or privacy enhancement. 
 
On the other hand, the effect of prevention focus is more complicated and contingent on decision 
frames. As noted earlier, the interaction effect between prevention focus and label is relatively easy 
to interpret: a congruence between a reduced prevention focus and the label emphasizing 
gains/advancements (i.e., social networking) can lead to positive attitudes.3 
 
The two-way interaction effect between prevention focus and default on perceived effort and 
confidence warrants more careful interpretations. To recap, a prevention focus is positively associated 
with favorable user experiences in the shared-by-default condition but not in the privacy-by-default 
condition. Intuitively, one can expect the opposite pattern: higher levels of prevention focus should 
be positively associated with favorable judgmental outcomes upon using privacy-by-default settings 
rather than shared-by-default settings due to its orientation towards safety. These seemingly 
counterintuitive findings can be explained by regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) and the “focus-
of-evaluation” effect (Dhar & Simonson, 1992; Sher & McKenzie, 2006). In the shared-by-default 
condition, the point of reference (the status quo, the initial point) for users was “Everyone.” Given 
that most users chose alternative options departing from the default, the deviation from the default 
can be conceived of as increasing privacy protection in comparison with the reference (“Everyone,” 
the lowest level of privacy protection). People with a strong prevention orientation focus on an 
undesired end-state and use vigilance strategies to move away from it (avoidance) (Pham & Higgins, 
2005). Since individuals with a strong prevention focus are sensitive to security and safety, these acts 
(departure from shared-by-default, an undesirable initial point) appear to have a positive impact on 
users’ judgments, as they chose stricter privacy options, abandoning the shared-by-default. The 
findings suggest that a deeper theoretical understanding of users—including their goal orientations 
and underlying processes involved in decision-making—would greatly facilitate researchers and 
practitioners in understanding users and their privacy decisions. 
  
With regards to H3, we did not find support for the moderating effect of regulatory focus on the 
association between defaults and preference. In contrast, Craciun (2018) has demonstrated a 
significant moderating effect such that default effects are more pronounced for prevention-focused 
individuals than for promotion-focused ones. A possible reason for these different results would be 
that two studies are different in terms of context (e-commerce versus SNSs) and the nature of 
outcomes (monetary versus non-monetary rewards). Another potential explanation could be the 
lower power of this study because we tested several options whereas Craciun (2018) tested 
dichotomous options (disclose or non-disclose). Given that there is a dearth of privacy studies 
examining the role of regulatory focus, we suggest that it should be worthwhile to continue to explore 
the effect of regulatory focus on privacy-related attitudes and behavior across different contexts. We 
also suggest that future studies should revisit this research topic to specify the conditions under which 
regulatory focus plays varying roles in privacy decision-making. 
 
We performed additional post-hoc tests to determine whether the default effect observed in this 
study is contingent on other motivational factors, such as issue involvement (operationalized as 
privacy concern). Heuristic information processing and cognitive biases have a weaker impact when 
decision makers are strongly involved in an issue at hand (Wang & Lee, 2006). As such, privacy 
concerns as a proxy of involvement can be a moderator of default effect (Park, June, & Macinnis, 
2000). However, the results of preliminary analyses showed that privacy concern did not have any 
significant main or interaction effects on the outcome. Hence, we omit privacy concern from our final 
model. The nonsignificant main effect of privacy concern on privacy decision-making is unexpected. 
However, the results are not too surprising given that the association between privacy concern and 
privacy-related behavior has been found to be inconsistent in many previous studies (see Kokolakis, 
2017 for a review on privacy paradox). 
 
6.1. Implications for research 
Overall, our findings suggest that simple alterations of the status quo and the order of the other 
options being presented shift users’ choices, even though the two situations are logically equivalent. 
Previous studies have shown that when people are given a choice task, their preferences are often 
constructed rather than generated by stable preferences. In other words, “preferences do not come 
readily from a list in memory, nor are they generated by some invariant algorithm” such as expected 
value calculation (Wang & Lee, 2006, p. 29). Numerous studies have examined privacy decision-
making using a rational-choice approach, such as privacy calculus (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016) and 
cognitive appraisals of threat and coping (e.g., Li, Juo, Zhang, & Xu, 2017). Our findings confirm that 
privacy decisions are situated in contexts and that privacy preference settings are an important 
contextual factor as they inherently involve decision frames. 
 
One could argue that default effects are observed in this study because many participants simply did 
not change default settings and clicked the “next” button to complete a task. However, when we re-
examined default effects on those who selected alternatives (nearly 90 percent of participants), a 
significant default effect was still observed to the extent that people chose options proximal to the 
default. Previous studies on privacy default effects operationalized privacy decisions as a binary choice 
(default versus non-default). As a result, users' choice of the non-default option was conceived of as 
the absence of the default effect. In this study, we employed a more granular approach by examining 
users’ choices in multiple, alternative options. We find that default effects exist even when people 
actively seek out other options. The results suggest that inattentiveness or effort cannot alone explain 
the default effect for most people. It would be useful to study further theoretical mechanisms, such 
as reference-dependent choice, endowment effect, or the focus of evaluation (Dhar & Simonson, 
1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), to gain a complete understanding of privacy default effects. 
 
  
In Study 2, we employed regulatory focus theory to specify conditions under which defaults have 
differing implications for users with different goal orientations. The results demonstrate the significant 
impact of regulatory focus on privacy decisions, particularly on judgmental factors. These relationships 
are also contingent on a degree of fit between default setting (or labels) and regulatory focus. Overall, 
the findings demonstrate that regulatory focus theory and its related concepts, such as regulatory fit 
(Higgins, 2011), provide a useful theoretical framework in which to examine the effects of users’ goals 
and goal orientations in privacy decision-making. 
 
Previous studies have examined regulatory focus in a variety of contexts, such as the effects of 
regulatory focus on attitude change and processing fluency (Aaker & Lee, 2001) and on behavioral 
intention to undertake an advocated action (Zhao & Pechmann, 2007). Though a few studies (Lwin et 
al., 2016; Mosteller & Poddar, 2017) have borrowed the concept of regulatory focus to suggest the 
difference between promotion-oriented privacy constructs (e.g., information disclosure) and 
prevention-oriented ones (e.g., privacy concerns and privacy protection), limited research has directly 
measured or manipulated regulatory focus to examine its impact on privacy decisions (see Craciun, 
2018 for exception). A combination of default effects and regulatory focus, as demonstrated in this 
study, provides us with a powerful tool with which to examine the interplay between contextual 
factors and individual factors or to specify conditions under which these factors have a positive, 
negative, or nonsignificant effect on social media users. As such, we suggest that building a bridge 
between privacy research, default effect, and regulatory focus literature offers potential to give rise 
to useful approaches toward researching online privacy. 
 
6.2. Practical implications 
Besides the aforementioned implications for research and theory, the findings also have some useful 
practical implications. SNS providers offer new and updated privacy settings to give users better 
control of their information privacy. For instance, Facebook quickly introduced a refreshed privacy 
settings after the Cambridge Analytica Scandal (New York Times, 2018b). However, people seldom 
modify or manage privacy settings (Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Lipford et al., 2008). Possible reasons for 
this under-utilization of privacy options include poor interface design, generalized trust in the online 
community, and a lack of motivation (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). Further, our findings show that the 
construction of privacy preferences are influenced by the inherent default effects, which may violate 
users' autonomy even when they are given choices through privacy settings. Studies have shown that 
social media users find the privacy settings confusing and time-consuming (Lipford et al., 2008) and 
that perceived difficulty leads people to use choice heuristics like default effects (Lee & Benbasat, 
2011). As such, usability is an important factor that practitioners should consider when aiming to 
enhance users' willingness or ability to put forth the effort to manage their information privacy using 
privacy settings. Given the strong default effects on users' privacy decision-making, we suggest that 
practitioners and designers should test different privacy interfaces and management tools to figure 
out ways to empower or assist users: for instance, the pros and cons of providing more granular 
options for users; the effectiveness of feedback systems that allow users to check whether their 
decisions are in line with their actual (or implicit) privacy preferences; visualization systems displaying 
the impact of users’ privacy preference settings on the visibility and searchability of their profiles; or 
a machine-learning approach that allows high-accuracy privacy settings using less user input than 
existing policy-specification tools. 
 
6.3. Limitations and directions for future studies 
There are several limitations of this study. First, though most hypotheses are supported in this study, 
overall effect sizes are relatively small. The robustness of the results should be further examined in 
subsequent studies. Second, research design is based on a hypothetical scenario. For some 
participants, this scenario-based experiment might be unrealistic, and their decision-making process 
could have been different in real-life contexts. Third, as mentioned earlier, there are at least several 
  
theoretical mechanisms simultaneously involved in default effects. Specifying which process is more 
accountable for the observed effect would be necessary for future research. The use of process 
measures, such as verbal protocols or eye movement tracking measures, might be useful to improve 
our understanding of potential theoretical mechanisms, such as the focus-of-evaluation effect. 
7. Conclusions 
Despite the shortcomings of this research, we believe that our study offers valuable insights about 
users' judgments and decision-making related to privacy and social networking. Information privacy is 
a key factor influencing how media users determine their interpersonal boundaries (Jia & Xu, 2016) 
and level of self-disclosure (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016), and how they use of new communication 
technologies (Pew Research Center, 2018). In this study, we suggest a novel approach to examining 
privacy decision-making by combining default effect and regulatory focus theory, with which we 
specify the ways in which users' choices are influenced by both a contextual factor (default settings), 
an individual factor (goal orientation: regulatory focus), and an interaction between them. The 
implications of defaults cannot be ignored, because “even when consequence are benign, default 
manipulations can violate consumer autonomy” (Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2013, p. 169). As such, 
we suggest that more theoretical and empirical investigations are needed to better understand why 
default effects exist in the context of privacy decision-making, or when the default effect can be 
intensified or reduced. We hope concerted research efforts to be continued so as to find powerful 
ways of understanding and assisting privacy decision-making in today's complex communication 
environment. 
 
7.1. Notes 
1. 
Note that we omitted manipulation checks because when “independent variable construct 
and its operationalizing are completely identical, a manipulation check would be unnecessary” 
(Mutz & Pemantle, 2015, p. 2). Manipulation checks are necessary when a study employs 
operations (e.g., a message) to manipulate a theoretical construct (information fluency) that 
cannot be manipulated directly. In our study, IVs (default and name) were directly 
manipulated, and they are identical to their operational definitions. Likewise, manipulation 
checks are omitted in most studies about default effects (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Lai & Hui, 
2006) and reference points and omission bias (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994). Manipulation checks 
for labeling were done in a separate study, and the results showed that the manipulation was 
successful in that differences in perceived privacy/networking management in two different 
labeling conditions were significant (t = 3.90, p < .001; t = 5.63, p < .001). 
2. 
As a post-hoc analysis, we explored in which condition users are more likely to choose the 
default options. We transformed the choice set answers (DV) into dichotomous variables 
(1 = default, 2 = non-default) and performed logistic analyses using three experimental 
conditions as IVs. The results showed that three factors had a nonsignificant effect on whether 
or not people choose the defaults, except for one choice question (“who can post on your 
personal page?”). For this question, people are more likely to choose the default option in the 
privacy-by-default condition than in the shared-by-default condition (β = .-0.85, p < .01). 
Other than that, the results suggest that the tendency for people to choose the defaults (due 
to inertia, laziness, or anchoring) is not affected by the label, name, or default settings. Note 
that the nonsignificant results are not contradictory to the main findings in study 1. That is, 
people choose the defaults (or alternatives proximal to them) in both default settings (privacy-
by-default versus shared-by-default), resulting in marked reversals in their decision outcomes 
depending on how a set of choices are framed. 
3. 
  
Interestingly, such an interaction effect is not observed for promotion focus. A possible reason 
is that a strong positive effect of promotion focus favoring choice and change overrides a 
potential moderation effect. 
Appendix A. Screenshots of default settings (Pull-down menu appears when a user clicks it) 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Interaction plots for prevention focus, label, and default settings 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1a. Attitude (Prevention × Label) Note: The shaded areas denote 95% confidence 
intervals. The vertical line marks the boundary between regions of significance and non-
significance based on α = 5% . 
 
Fig. 1b. Perceived effort (Prevention × Default) Note: The shaded areas denote 95% 
confidence intervals. The vertical line marks the boundary between regions of significance and 
non-significance based on α = 5% . 
 
 
 
Fig. 1c. Confidence (Prevention × Default) Note: The shaded areas denote 95% confidence 
intervals. The vertical line marks the boundary between regions of significance and non-
significance based on α = 5% . 
 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.07.001. 
 
